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The Salem witch-hunt, invoking the “red hunt” analogy of the McCarthy 
era, has been a persistent metaphor for persecution, a symbol of fanatic 
excess in policing community boundaries. Salem has been an enduring 
specter that haunts American cultural history, conjured time and again only 
to be dismissed as an abnormal episode of old world superstition, which 
“appeared to take place in America but was never of America” (Adams 
25). Though inseparable from New England Puritanism and thus integral to 
what is deemed as “quintessential” America, Salem is American only inso-
far as it proves un-American—that is, an exception to exceptional America 
as proclaimed in its founding ideals of democracy and human rights. In 
other words, Salem disavowed is constitutive of American national iden-
tity’s coming into being; it is a foundational other, in Donald E. Pease’s psy-
choanalytic terms, that endows the collective fantasy of American excep-
tionalism with ontological consistency (12). In particular, Tituba, the only 
non-white “witch” of the trials to whom the unleashing of the hysteria itself 
has often been attributed, embodies what is negated in Salem against which 
Americanness is to be affirmed. As Maryse Condé, a French Guadeloupean 
novelist, delves into this foundational gap three hundred years later, Tituba 
is recuperated from this darkness not only to reconfigure American identity 
but ultimately to reconsider what it means to be human. 
I, Tituba, Black Witch of Salem (published as Moi, Tituba, sorcière ... 
noire de Salem in 1986 and translated into English in 1992) is a fictional 
revision of the infamous history from the hitherto ignored perspective of 
Tituba, a slave from Barbados. In imaginatively reconstructing Tituba’s 
life, Condé provides her with a symbolic genealogy in the history of trans-
atlantic migration and slavery. Tituba is conceived as a hybrid product of 
modern history, born of an African mother who was raped by an English 
sailor on board the Christ the King during the Middle Passage. Growing up 
in Barbados, she learns the arts of voodoo and marries John Indian, her hus-
band in real life, before both are sold to Samuel Parris, a minister from Bos-
ton, and brought to Salem Village. The intervening story of the witchcraft 
trials follows historical records, after which she makes her fictional journey 
back home and joins a failed slave revolt against plantation owners. Tituba 
gets executed by hanging, but her spirit lives on and incites future revolts. If 
Tituba’s racial identity endows her with historical complexities, her power-
ful sexuality functions as a means to reclaim subjectivity. She passionately 
falls in love with John Indian and maintains throughout her life a number of 
romantic liaisons, including a Jewish merchant, a young revolutionary half 
her age, and even a fictional Hester Prynne.
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Thus, by summoning Tituba into the realm of literary imagination, the 
novel connects the English Caribbean with the colonial United States, 
bringing the question of American identity into transnational as well as 
transhistorical consideration. Specifically, by juxtaposing Tituba’s Carib-
beanness with colonial Americanness, Condé explores the complex inter-
connectedness of identities across spatial and temporal boundaries, and in 
doing so, she calls for the reader’s renewed attention to what it means to be 
human. In her words, she desires to focus on “the particular story” of Tituba 
rather than such “generalities” as “giving voice to the silenced collectivity,” 
on her individual self rather than her collective identity (Scarboro 204).1
Although Tituba is a real-life figure from an actual event, I, Tituba is not 
so much a realist historical novel as a postmodernist experimentation. Crit-
ics take note of its postmodern/postcolonial exploration of Tituba’s identity 
while highlighting its emphasis on historicity. Specifically, the novel clev-
erly escapes “the double trap” of the historical novel’s claim of represent-
ing reality as well as the notorious postmodern turn to “freeplay” (Arnold 
714). Thereby, it does not so much play with “historical indeterminacy” as 
it pursues “historical truths,” if not about Tituba’s factual life, then about 
Puritanism in colonial New England (Jalalzai 413). In so doing, I, Tituba 
illustrates an alternative Caribbean identity that defies the double bind of 
either assimilation or opposition to white colonial rule, resisting “identitary 
essence” (Bécel 609-14). 
Moreover, Tituba’s racial and sexual identities are given particular at-
tention in recuperating her historical absence in contrast to the prominent 
presence of Salem in American history. Critics point out that if race deter-
mines Tituba’s erasure, sexuality is the primary venue for the reclamation 
of her agency. For example, in bringing together Tituba and Hester Prynne 
in the fictional terrain and juxtaposing the two women’s deaths, Tituba ex-
ecuted/silenced and Hester suicidal/self-willed, the novel illustrates how 
race forced Tituba into the shadow of Nathaniel Hawthorne’s prominence 
in American literary scene, argues Mara Dukats, because “when we paint 
1 Caribbean literature gained its initial momentum with Aimé Césaire’s negritude movement in the 1930s, 
which identified itself exclusively with Afro-Caribbean ethnicity. In an attempt to better address the diver-
sity of this region, Edouard Glissant coined Antillanité or Caribbeanness in the 1980s to highlight the hy-
brid cultural heritage. As a “re-visioning” of negritude and Caribbeanness, “creoleness” emerged in 1989 
emphasizing “the exploration of the self” beyond the recuperation of the collective past and celebrating its 
unique diversity in “a liberated, nonauthoritarian expression.” (Scarboro 190-92)
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Hester black, then The Scarlet Letter, as we know it, becomes inconceiv-
able” (51-61).2 In contrast, Tituba’s sexuality is highlighted to reconfigure 
her identity. As a sexual subject, Tituba refuses first and foremost the script-
ed role of enslaved women as the victim of rape—as “objects of violence” 
and “subjects of fear” (Manzor-Coats 740). Similarly, Tituba’s flagrant cel-
ebration of erotic love signals her claim of agency as the subject of desire 
and thus, as the human subject. Particularly interesting is Kaiama Glover’s 
take on Tituba’s sexuality as the primary marker of human condition—as 
embracing human “fallability” “without Adamic shame” (“Confronting 
the Communal” 187). According to her, Tituba’s sexual choice indicates 
her determination to “fall,” and in privileging her “sexual selfhood” over 
various conditions of enslavement, she chooses “an existential liberation” 
(“Tituba’s Fall” 103).3
At this juncture, a set of questions may arise if we regard Tituba’s sexual 
choice as her conscious act of choosing human freedom. To begin with, we 
may wonder what it means to be human and to have the freedom to choose. 
If Tituba chose to be human and free, why was she denied her humanity 
as well as freedom? Was her understanding of being human different from 
what was proclaimed so famously by America’s Founding Fathers? If so, 
how was her conception different from theirs? In thus linking together the 
English Caribbean with the colonial United States, I would argue, Condé 
questions the liberal humanist assumptions underlying American identity. 
Liberal humanism, broadly defined in the cultural tradition of the West, 
is premised upon self-possessed individualism, positing the subject as the 
owner of oneself and absolutely independent from the world. Of course, its 
problematic dualism has long been criticized for constructing the privileged 
subject as a white European male and suppressing the rest of the otherwise 
marked humanity. I, Tituba is one of such critical attempts to probe into an 
alternative possibility of becoming human. Specifically, in Condé’s Salem, 
the New England Puritans come to showcase the primal scene of American 
2 Condé summons Hester as Tituba’s jail mate, who hangs herself while pregnant with Pearl.
3 For further critical studies on the novel, see the following. Lisa Bernstein approaches the witch figure as 
a deconstruction of fixed notions of subjectivity; Mara L. Dukats in “A Narrative of Violated Maternity” 
reads Tituba’s story as a critique of compulsory maternity; Elisabeth Mudimbé-Boyi pays attention to the 
authorial position of Condé in the textualization of Tituba’s story; Larysa Mykyta takes Tituba’s female 
friendships as existing on the “lesbian continuum”; Faye Ringel takes interest in the fantastic world of 
witches, ghosts, and spirits as part of this world; Suzanne Roszak compares Condé’s Tituba with Arthur 
Miller’s play in terms of the Bildungsroman; and Merinda K. Simmons focuses on the question of “authen-
ticity” along shifting subject positions. 
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identity formation, in which the personal, national, and religious subjectivi-
ties are fused to form the American self as the autonomous self-possessed 
individual. Tituba, in contrast, exemplifies an alternative meaning of the 
subject as the embodied being-in-relations destined to come to terms with 
the self in an ethical relationship with the other. In short, Condé’s Tituba il-
lustrates how human freedom is not absolutely possessed by the individual 
but relational in interpersonal/ transnational and sedimentary/transhistori-
cal senses. 
Self-Possessed Puritans in America’s Salem
Though Salem continued to be an enduring presence over the succeeding 
course of American history, its signification changed under the shifting his-
torical circumstances. The Salem witchcraft trials proceeded from January 
1692 to May 1693 in Essex County, Massachusetts. Nineteen women were 
hanged, one man was pressed to death by heavy stones, and eight more 
were convicted but escaped execution.4 Although the signifying modes for 
Salem changed down the course of history, its status as the national Other 
continued to persist. According to Gretchen Adams, during the eighteenth-
century Revolutionary and nation-building era, Salem was to represent 
everything that America was supposedly not—old world, savage, and ir-
rational as opposed to the new nation, modern and rational; and during the 
Civil War, radical abolitionists were attacked as “intolerant fanatics” and 
“witch burner[s]” (26). In the postbellum Reconstruction era, however, the 
4 Explanations vary as to the causes of the Salem hysteria. The pre-Enlightenment worldview underlay 
many witchcraft suspicions as natural phenomena or illnesses, lacking logical or scientific accounts, were 
attributed to supernatural powers. Especially as traditional communal ties broke down in the early modern 
period, the villagers would refuse to offer charitable assistance to their poorer neighbors, and when subse-
quently experiencing misfortunes, they would project their own feelings of guilt onto those whose requests 
they had rejected, accusing them as malevolent witches responsible for the putative afflictions. Specifically 
with regard to the Salem witch-hunt, some scholars pay attention to political, economic, familial, and reli-
gious conflicts among the residents of Salem Village while others find links to a concurrent and prolonged 
Indian war on the Maine-New Hampshire frontier. For a historical overview of the scholarly approaches 
to the Salem witchcraft trials, see Mary Beth Norton’s article, “Witchcraft in the Anglo-American Colo-
nies” (2003). Sir Keith Thomas examines witchcraft accusations in early modern England in Religion and 
the Decline of Magic: Studies in Popular Beliefs in Sixteenth and Seventeenth-Century England (1971). 
Paul Boyer and Stephen Nissenbaum locate the origins of the Salem hysteria in land disputes among the 
residents in Salem Possessed: The Social Origins of Witchcraft (1974); and Mary Beth Norton traces fron-
tier connections and links to Indian warfare in In the Devil’s Snare: The Salem Witchcraft Crisis of 1692 
(2002).
RUPTURING SALEM, RECONSIDERING SUBJECTIVITY
48 American Studies in Scandinavia, 51:1
Puritan as the national icon was summoned back for reconciliation, but the 
less problematic Pilgrim was to substitute the Puritan as the single symbol 
of colonial founding: “The relatively unknown Plymouth Pilgrim was eas-
ily shaped to serve as the exemplar of the newly important American value 
of ‘tolerance’ while the Puritan’s reputation declined under the stigma of 
‘intolerance’” (Adams 26). Finally, as the full-scale cold war raged in the 
mid-twentieth century, Puritan New England of 1692 was summoned once 
again to name McCarthy’s America of 1952, and by marking the ideologi-
cal persecution as Salem-like hysteria, it was dismissed as yet another aber-
rant episode of fanaticism in the otherwise rational progress of American 
history. 
As such, Salem epitomizes a contradiction in American identity, whose 
Puritan tradition is simultaneously upheld and dismissed as much American 
as it is un-American. To borrow from Pease, Salem functions as the na-
tional Other onto which the inherent contradiction in the “state fantasy” of 
American exceptionalism is projected, explaining away the national ideal’s 
failure to come about as an aberration, or an exception to American excep-
tionalism. These “psychosocial structures of disavowal” were crucial, ac-
cording to Pease, to “the production of the state’s exceptions insofar as they 
sustained the attitude through which U.S. citizens willfully misrepresented 
their history as well as their place in the world” (12). Interestingly, as his-
torical changes mandated different takes on Salem to re-imagine America, 
Tituba’s identity transformed alongside from “Indian” to black, illuminat-
ing that the racial/ethnic axis functions as the crucial formative site of the 
national Other.
If Salem has been the indivisible shadow that shaped and clarified the 
contours of America’s self-image, Tituba, whether Native American or Af-
rican in origin, incarnates racialized trajectories of American identity. An 
“Indian” to her contemporaries in times of bloody “Indian wars,” she be-
came “Negro” in the mid-nineteenth century when the institution of slavery 
was most controversial, solidifying into a voodoo-practicing Afro-Caribbe-
an American by the mid-twentieth century in Arthur Miller’s The Crucible 
(1953).5 Her transformation from Native American to black illuminates the 
5 Elaine Breslaw sees her as an Arawak Indian, who had been kidnapped to Barbados where she was pur-
chased and brought to New England by Samuel Parris. Peter Charles Hoffer, on the other hand, argues 
that she was a Yoruban African on the basis of the etymology of her name. But as Bernard Rosenthal says, 
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racial/ethnic components of the “scapegoat,” as Bernard Rosenthal puts it, 
against which America needed to project its “guilt, fear, and hatred” (50). 
In other words, Tituba embodies the racialized national Other to explain 
away the failure of the national ideal as an exception to American excep-
tionalism. In Toni Morrison’s terms, she is the Africanist presence in the 
shadow of American identity formation: “a nonwhite, Africanlike (or Afri-
canist) presence or persona” in American literature, crucial to the making 
of a coherent sense of “Americanness” (5-6). It was not until Condé’s 1986 
scrutiny into the vestiges of Salem that Tituba came out of her long shadow 
to shed light on the violence of history that was the violation of humanity. 
In Condé’s fictional space, the Puritans in colonial New England rep-
resent the ideological assumptions about subjectivity as disembodied self-
possession. According to C. B. Macpherson’s analysis of “possessive in-
dividualism,” the subject is first and foremost self-possessed in that he is 
“the proprietor of his own person or capacities” and that human freedom 
means “freedom from dependence on the wills of others” (3). The indi-
vidual is conceptualized as the owner of oneself, and he is free insofar as 
he holds the right to dispose at will his possessions, including his own labor 
in exchange for wages. The subject, in other words, is projected as a self-
possessed being independent of the society of others and endowed with 
“an agency, desire, or will belonging to the self and clearly distinguished 
from the ‘wills of others’” (Hayles 3). Moreover, the erasure of embodi-
ment is another attribute of this stand-alone liberal subject. The famous 
Cartesian subject is identified with the mind, a disembodied pure reason, 
and he merely contemplates with God-like objectivity, rather than inhabits, 
the material world. In other words, “the liberal subject possessed a body but 
was not usually represented as being a body” (Hayles 4). Separated from 
the body, the self is thus enabled to claim its notorious universality, erasing 
racial, ethnic, and sexual markers of bodily difference. 
the etymology argument is useless because “nobody knows how Tituba received her name” (49). In a 
cultural sense, according to Rosenthal, she seems of Indian ethnicity since the legal documents of her day 
consistently define her as “Indian” while making clear distinctions between “Indians” and “Negroes” (49). 
Tituba the Indian becomes darker and enters the world of myths in the nineteenth century with Charles W. 
Upham’s Lectures on Witchcraft, Comprising a History of the Delusion in Salem in 1692 (1831) and Salem 
Witchcraft (1867). It was Upham who created the image of Tituba telling “exotic” tales of witchcraft from 
the Caribbean Islands to a circle of credulous girls of Salem. An ambiguously pigmented “dark Tituba” 
then merges with the myth of original sin, and this “dark Eve” serves as the evil other in the making of the 
American self (Rosenthal, Salem Story 13).
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Such a notion of subjectivity constitutes the backbone of American iden-
tity, as it was famously declared that “all men” are created equal and en-
dowed with basic rights for life, liberty and happiness (Jefferson 19). But 
the premise of proclaimed freedom and equality was based on possessive 
individualism, where the subject can be autonomous insofar as he owns 
mental and material capacities, and as the self-owner, he is free to use his 
own capacities as well as equal in the sameness of self-ownership because it 
is “a status that every individual can enjoy equally” (Carens 2). In colonial 
America, however, the alleged universality of freedom and equality was 
in fact conditional and exclusive as one’s humanness was defined in terms 
of race, gender, and material ownership. It meant only a propertied man of 
European descent could fall into the category of the human since women 
and non-white people were regarded as incapable of rational thinking and 
thus, unfit for citizenship. This inconsistency in American identity has been 
manifested in numerous junctures of American history from the persecution 
in Salem to the institution of slavery. Perhaps, Thomas Jefferson himself, 
the epitome of American Enlightenment ideology, is also the prominent 
embodiment of this foundational contradiction. The progenitor of the free 
and equal American subject was a slave-holder who believed in the hierar-
chy of humanity according to skin color, from the white down to the black 
to the “Oranootan” at the bottom, thereby advocating the removal of freed 
slaves “beyond the reach of mixture” for fear of “staining the blood of his 
master” (Jefferson 264-70). 
In I, Tituba, America’s national narrative is given as Hester’s symbolic 
ancestry, originating with the arrival of the Pilgrims on the Mayflower, “fer-
vent Separatists who had come to build the kingdom of the true God”—
“dangerous” projects, in Hester’s words, which begat the “fanaticism” of 
their descendants (97). New England Puritan ideology has been frequent-
ly proposed as the primal factor in the construction of American identity. 
Sacvan Bercovitch, in his seminal The Puritan Origins of the American 
Self, delineates the trinitarian fusion in the formation of the American self: 
“country, saint, and church reflected one another,” and “the idea of America 
implied all three in the proper apocalyptic context” (101). By combining 
personal and national identity with millennial soteriology, the New England 
Puritans gave America “the status of visible sainthood” and the literature 
of “the anthropomorphic nationalism”: “American dream, manifest destiny, 
redeemer nation, and, fundamentally, the American self as representative of 
universal rebirth” (108). Underlying the trinitarian American self is the fa-
miliar Western worldview of binary divisions, which, unfortunately, entails 
violence. For in this divided universe, the elected, whether to be saved or to 
build “a city upon a hill,” confronted the others as damned—as threats to be 
identified and purged, and the New World was a hostile wilderness for them 
to tame and possess. The American self is then the self-possessed subject, 
positioned in a confrontational stance against the surrounding world of oth-
ers—identified as a threat to his independence or as the objectified material 
world to be subdued, exploited, and possessed.
Thus, Condé inhabits her imaginative space with self-appointed “visible 
saints” (98) determined to preserve their elected status, or self-possessive 
freedom, against any presumably hostile encroachment of the wills of oth-
ers, or “visible messengers of Satan” (65). When Tituba arrives in Salem 
Village as a servant of Samuel Parris, the newly appointed minister from 
whose household the infamous hysteria first broke out, she wonders in be-
wilderment: 
Imagine a small community of men and women oppressed by the presence of Satan and 
seeking to hunt him down in all his manifestations. A cow that died, a child smitten with 
convulsions, a girl whose menstrual period was late in coming set off a chain of unending 
speculation. Who had caused such catastrophes by driving a bargain with the formidable 
enemy? (65)
Combining the worldview of pre-Enlightenment superstition and biblical 
mysticism, early Puritans seem to have dwelled in the frightening universe 
of binary morality, fiercely vindictive to those branded as others and liter-
ally hunting them down as “witches.” Problematically, otherness is usu-
ally marked upon the socially weak by those more empowered in a given 
society—notably, in terms of gender, race, and class. In Salem, along with 
the women persecuted as witches, Tituba’s “color was indicative of [her] 
close connections with Satan” (65). And her color, defined as the sign of 
evil/otherness, then served as a sufficient ground to condemn her as “dregs 
of hell” (36) and reduce her humanity into property relations of the slave 
system, “striking [her] off the map of human beings” as “a nonbeing” (24). 
The liberal dichotomy also effaces the embodiment of the human sub-
ject. The liberal subject is to possess the body, but not be the body. The 
body is positioned as the opposite of the soul, the evil/other dragging 
down the soul’s lofty journey toward liberation. The Puritan denial of the 
body and earthly pleasure is manifest even in their grim attire. Betsey and 
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Abigail, two children of the Parris household whose hysterical outbursts 
marked the beginning of the witchcraft trials, were “wearing long black 
gowns that contrasted with their small white aprons,” and “their brows were 
capped with hoods, where every wisp of hair had been pushed out of sight” 
(39). The body, especially the beauty of the female body, is synonymous 
with evil temptation and therefore, subject to strict surveillance and disci-
pline. Elizabeth, Samuel Parris’s wife, tells Tituba that the abomination is 
so great for Parris as to make him “take [her] without removing either his 
clothes or [hers], so hurried is he to finish with the hateful act” (42). The 
body and sexual act are the signs of humanity’s fall from grace in Christian 
mythology—“Satan’s heritage in us” (42). Similar signs of life and expres-
sions of pleasure are prohibited: children are not to be told imaginative 
stories because “dreaming isn’t good for them” (43), nor are they supposed 
to “dance” (48). It is a society that, as Elizabeth laments to Tituba, places “a 
curse on being a woman”—a society of “malediction” (43), or male-diction 
that dictates the lives of women and people of color under the binary law 
of the father.
Tituba, the Witch of Infinity
Unlike the Puritans who saw their subjectivity as disembodied self-posses-
sion, Tituba always takes herself as the embodied being-in-relations. For 
her, the human being is not so much a stand-alone subject with absolute 
autonomy as a bodily being in relation to others existing across space and 
time. Here, Emmanuel Levinas’s ethics of the other might help elucidate the 
key differences in supposing the human subject. The bodiless autonomous 
Puritan self proposes the human being as a concept in a neutral third realm 
that Levinas calls a totality. It is the totalizing system like the Hegelian Geist 
into which individuals are subsumed as parts of the whole or as examples of 
the same species. So when I find myself existing in this neutral universe, I 
take the other people and things as the same as me and as objects disposable 
for my enjoyment and use. It is characteristic of subjectivism in the Western 
philosophical tradition, which places the self in the center of perception and 
treats the other either as an extension of myself or as a mere object. Thus, in 
the totalizing process, there is always a violence done to the singular because 
“every singularity escapes its concept” and “it is what the concept has to 
control and repress by abolishing difference” (Large 24). In contrast, Tituba 
comes forward as a bodily/sexual subject, who always perceives herself in 
relation to other beings. For her, the other is not part of her existential proj-
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ect, but the alien being she comes to know as radically different. To put oth-
erwise, the object of the idea is greater than the idea of it, and my experience 
of the other is not reducible to an idea of my having that experience. This 
going-beyond-my-experience by giving willed effort to transcend subjectiv-
ism of totalizing thinking is what Levinas calls infinity. 
With this “concept of infinity,” this “‘beyond’ the totality and objective 
experience,” Levinas urges us to imagine a different model of subjectivity 
(23), and as the embodied being-in-relations, Tituba epitomizes this alter-
native subjectivity, which seeks to transcend the violence of subjectivism 
and to become a free and responsible individual. For Levinas, the primary 
process of subject formation begins with the other, not with the self. In his 
ethics, the self is constituted as a posterior to the other, whose absolute for-
eignness demands me to give “a real response, a responsible answer” (Wild 
14) and thereby to recognize the other as a being independent from my ego-
centric conceptualization. The self cannot escape this coming face to face 
with the other because the human subject is a bodily being conditioned to 
exist in the material world of others. This experience of being “already split 
from within,” as though “the other occupied my place despite me” (Large 
8), is the fundamental condition of the subject that is never self-contained 
and autonomous but always already “open” to the world. As Maurice Mer-
leau-Ponty puts it, the subject is from the beginning “destined to the world” 
(xii), or “I am from the start outside myself and open to the world” (Doyle). 
This openness of the self to the demand of the other, which Levinas calls an 
“extra-territoriality” (150), is the existential condition precisely because the 
human subject is an embodied being that comes into existence through per-
ception. And the process of perception happens in a time lag, a gap within 
the self because I exist simultaneously as the perceiving subject and the 
object of perception: I speak and hear myself, for example, in a circle of 
time that is almost but never completely closed. This creates an existential 
loophole opening up the subject to the world. This “noncoincidence” is, ac-
cording to Laura Doyle, “the pivot of my-existence-in-the-world, the split 
second when existence happens.”6 
Condé’s project of recuperating Tituba’s humanity primarily concerns 
claiming her agency as a powerfully sexual being. Tituba flaunts her body 
6 According to Merleau-Ponty, the subject is always intersubject or being-in-the-world. The slippage inher-
ent in the constitution of subjectivity enables the self to place oneself as an object in a complex field of 
relations as intersubjects.
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and delights in erotic love with multiple lovers throughout her fictional life. 
Tituba’s sexuality is precisely a means not just to reclaim but also to rede-
fine subjectivity as the embodied being inherently open to the other. For her, 
the body is not an object to be ashamed of but her very being realized by 
the process of mutual recognition: “What is more beautiful than a woman’s 
body! Especially when it is glorified by man’s desire!” (43) Sex, for her, is 
“the most beautiful act in the world,” not “the hateful act,” and it represents 
“life” and procreation, not “Satan’s heritage” (42). When she first fell for 
John Indian, her husband both in historical and fictional life, she admits 
without reservation that what “[made her] sick with love for him” was “the 
huge bump of his penis” (19). And when she dances for the first time in 
their initial courtship, she alludes to the biblical myth of original sin, rewrit-
ing it as a symbolic act of (pro)creation: “A mysterious serpent had entered 
me. Was it the primordial snake […] in the form of god the creator of all 
things on the surface of the earth?” (17) The body, for Tituba, is neither an 
object to be controlled nor a concept to be subsumed in the Puritan total-
ity of possessive individualism. Rather, embodiedness is the fundamental 
human condition, where my existence happens as both the subject and ob-
ject through constant interactions with the world. It is the basis of ethical 
subjectivity because I am not only grounded “in my everyday existence,” 
but more importantly “in my relation to the other, who transcends both my 
practical use of things and their examination” (Large 40). 
For Tituba, human subjectivity rests not so much on the assertion of 
absolute freedom from the wills of others. On the contrary, it comes into 
existence when freedom is inverted into obligation to others. In order to 
move in with John Indian, a slave of Susanna Endicott, Tituba chooses to 
become a slave of her own free will. In first meeting the mistress and her 
visitors, she is shocked to experience a violent erasure of her being: “They 
were talking about me and yet ignoring me. […] Tituba only existed insofar 
as these women let her exist. It was atrocious. Tituba became ugly, coarse, 
and inferior because they will her so” (24). Theirs is the totalizing universe 
that reduces the other as my extension or an object I can manipulate accord-
ing to my will and advantage. As Tituba laments, “the slaves […] were far 
freer than I was. For the slaves had not chosen their chains. […] That is 
exactly what I had done” (25). In choosing self-enslavement, she upholds, 
as Glover argues, “a freedom of sexual choice,” privileging “an existential 
liberation” over social emancipation from slavery (“Tituba’s Fall” 103). 
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Tituba’s fierce assertion of her sexual selfhood signifies her determined re-
fusal to subscribe to the master tropes of the American slave narrative: the 
enslaved black woman as victim of rape on the one hand, and the narrative 
of progress from slavery to liberation and enlightenment on the other hand. 
In so doing, Tituba sheds light on “the sexual will” of the enslaved woman, 
typically silenced in the slave narrative as the “virtuous” heroine proceeds 
toward “predetermined models of freedom” (“Tituba’s Fall” 99, 104-105). 
Tituba’s sexuality establishes her as the subject of desire, and more im-
portantly, as the ethical subject. For desire, according to Levinas, is precise-
ly that which transcends me and my self-centered categories: it is the will to 
experience what is “absolutely other” (33). Unlike need, which seeks to fill 
a lack in the subject, “the Desire does not fulfil it, but deepens it” (Levinas 
34) because if I desire or love someone, “the more of them I have the more 
I love them” (Large 25). Tituba’s choice to be a slave is an act of love that 
impels her to take the risk of going out of her way and trying to give to the 
other. Whereas possessive individualism posits the other as a threat to the 
freedom of the self, ethical subjectivity recognizes the freedom of the other 
as their independence from me and my arbitrary categories. Whereas iden-
tifying the other as a threat incurs a need to suppress and expunge it, recog-
nizing the other as independent from me entails an acknowledgement of the 
exteriority within interiority—the presence of the other already inhabiting 
the self from within. This split self-consciousness leads to, like W. E. B. 
DuBois’s “double consciousness” (45), the recognition of my dependency 
on the other for the constitution of the self. Thus, the ethical subject begins 
by inverting my freedom into my obligation to the other: “Morality begins 
when freedom, instead of being justified by itself, feels itself to be arbitrary 
and violent” (Levinas 84). 
The contradiction in that Tituba has to submit to a bondage in order to be 
free originates in the institution of slavery—the binary universe of posses-
sive individualism which premises my freedom upon the suppression of the 
other. In the inversion of her freedom, in contrast, Tituba acknowledges the 
originary dependency of the self on the other, thus recognizing that freedom 
rests in not so much my right as my obligation to the other. After all the 
lovers she has had in her life, Tituba confesses towards the end of the nov-
el that her “heart” “had never belonged to anybody else but John Indian” 
(170), whom she loved, despite his slavish subservience to white masters 
and his eventual betrayal of her trust, for his “weakhearted[ness]” (152), 
and she confides, “some men who have the virtue of being weak instill in us 
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the desire to be a slave!” (140) In recognizing the weakness in her husband, 
Tituba sees the violence of the totalizing system of slavery, and in choosing 
self-enslavement for him, she inverts her freedom to experience his radi-
cal otherness. Tituba’s insistent sexuality to the point of self-enslavement 
is then testimony to her extraordinary ability to transcend the self and to 
desire the infinity of the other. 
Ethical subjectivity is most clearly illustrated in Condé’s deliberate re-
construction of Tituba as “the witch.” As Elizabeth Reis propounds, the 
seventeenth-century New England witch trials were unleashed primarily 
because Puritanism functioned as lived religion for people, who believed in 
Satan’s physical presence and literal possession of weaker souls and bod-
ies, often feminine because they were supposed to be more vulnerable than 
men. Besides, the devil’s possession of the witches, according to Boris Ve-
jdovsky, had sexual connotations, disturbing the established order and au-
thority of Puritan fathers and leading to witch hunts as a result of “anxieties 
of sexual inadequacy and logocentric impotency”: “Witchcraft, embodied 
in the flesh of the witches and their victims, threatens to unman the patri-
archs of the colonies and send them back to self-doubt and impotence” (60). 
In other words, the Salem witch hunts, manifested in terms of economic, 
local political, and psychological conflicts, boil down to the patriarchal sub-
ject’s paranoid attempts to police and subsume the other within the bound-
aries of totality. In I, Tituba, Condé ruminates on the symbolic meaning 
of the witch as the historical and metaphoric other in a totalizing system 
from patriarchy to slavery to racist society. Terrified when witnessing an 
execution of a witch named Goody Glover7 by a “restless, inquisitive, 
almost joyful crowd” of Salem (49), Tituba explicitly connects the incident 
with the deaths of her mother and herself by another kind of mob violence, 
an allusion to lynching: “All around me strange trees were bristling with 
strange fruit” (172). Thus, in her “powerless rage,” Tituba screams: “What 
kind of a world was this that had turned me into a slave, an orphan, and an 
outcast?” (49)
Condé, in contrast, redefines the witch as the very epitome of infinity, in-
carnating the desire to transcend the self and experience the absolute other. 
7 This episode is Condé’s reference to the story of the Goodwin children that had been well known through 
Cotton Mather’s account in “Memorable Providences.” In 1688, the four Goodwin children were afflicted, 
and a woman identified as Glover was accused of bewitching them and hanged for it. (Rosenthal, Salem 
Story 2)
57
For Tituba, the witch is born with “a superior gift of nature” “to commu-
nicate with the invisible world, to keep constant links with the dead, to 
care for others and heal” (17). The witch teaches us “the upper spheres of 
knowledge” that “everything lives, has a soul, and breathes,” that “every-
thing must be respected,” and that “man is not the master riding through 
his kingdom on horseback” (9). In short, Tituba embodies the witch as the 
ethical subject that surpasses the self to communicate with the other. Also, 
to desire the other who transcends me means, for Levinas, to seek truth 
because seeking truth is “movement outwards towards the other,” not “the 
reduction of the world to myself” (Large 33). It is an act of desire because it 
wants more than the satisfaction of my need to know the world, and desire 
is only possible in relation to the other. Unlike the solipsistic God of the 
Puritan universe that divides the master from the rest, truth or this “God” 
is concerned with the destitution of the other and can only be found in our 
ethical relation to others: “God rises to his supreme and ultimate presence 
as correlative to the justice rendered unto men” (Levinas 78). For Tituba, 
truth is not the cognitive subsumption of particular individuals into the ab-
stract concepts of totality. Truth for her means to go beyond the basic need 
to “stay alive”: “No, [being alive] wasn’t all that mattered. Life, life had to 
be given a new meaning. But how?” (137) In other words, truth means to 
love and desire the other, to acknowledge the anteriority of the other in the 
constitution of the subject, and to choose self-enslavement in the inversion 
of her freedom as a recognition of the irreducible singularity of the other. 
Afterword
In her fictional post-Salem life, Tituba is executed by hanging for helping 
organize a slave revolt back in Barbados, and “[her] real story starts where 
this one leaves off and it has no end” (175). She becomes “one and the 
same” with her beloved island, and in this “constant and extraordinary sym-
biosis” with nature, she takes her ultimate “revenge” for her “long solitude 
in the deserts of America” (177). Her spirit, so to speak, is alive and among 
us as memory because the dead “live on if we cherish them and honor their 
memory” (10). Dismissed from history except only as a summary footnote, 
“a slave originating from the West Indies and probably practicing ‘hoo-
doo’” (110), Tituba literally steps outside of totalizing history: “I do not 
belong to the civilization of the Bible and Bigotry. My people will keep 
my memory in their hearts and have no need for the written word” (176). 
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History is a closed totality because its narrative begins and ends with the 
writing subject’s projection and validation of existing concepts and catego-
ries, and that is why history is always the justification of the victors. Thus, 
violence of history, be it war, slavery, or patriarchy, would not be ceased 
without completely breaking with history. This rupture with history, which 
Levinas calls “prophetic eschatology” (22), provides an exterior viewpoint 
from outside of the historical narrative, and thus, forever on the side of the 
victims, it tells the stories of silenced voices. 
Tituba’s “revenge” is then this telling of a different reality, the suffer-
ing of others, reminding us of the silenced presence of the other in his-
tory, or the exteriority within interiority of human subjectivity. Ironically, 
by becoming a spirit in the world, Tituba effectively illustrates the human 
subject as the embodied being-in-relations, or the body as the incarnation 
of thousands of years of human history. Her spirit is alive in the sedimented 
simultaneity of the past, present, and future, and her story is counter to his-
tory because it constantly intervenes from outside and ruptures the totality 
of history with the infinity of the other. As Tituba confides in us, “What is 
one life in relation to the immensity of time?” (178)
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